bygone
Χάρη στην έμφυτα ανταγωνιστική φύση της, η αστική κοινωνία όχι μόνο στρέφει τους ανθρώπους τον ένα ενάντια στον άλλο, αλλά κι ολόκληρη την ανθρωπότητα ενάντια στον φυσικό κόσμο. Η αντίληψη ότι ο άνθρωπος πρέπει να κυριαρχήσει πάνω στο περιβάλλον, προέρχεται άμεσα από την κυριαρχία του ανθρώπου πάνω στον άνθρωπο. Ο εκφυλισμός του περιβάλλοντος είναι άμεσα συνδεδεμένος με τον εκφυλισμό της υπάρχουσας κοινωνικής δομής. Οι ανάγκες κατασκευάζονται από τα ΜΜΕ για να δημιουργήσουν μια ζήτηση για ολότελα άχρηστα εμπορεύματα, που το καθένα έχει σχεδιαστεί προσεκτικά για να φθαρεί μετά από μια προκαθορισμένη χρονική περίοδο. Η λεηλασία του ανθρώπινου πνεύματος από την αγορά μπορεί να παραλληλιστεί με τη λεηλασία του πλανήτη από το κεφάλαιο. Η ιδιοκτητική κοινωνία, η κυριαρχία, η ιεραρχία και το κράτος, σ’ όλες τους τις μορφές είναι εντελώς ασυμβίβαστες με την επιβίωση της βιόσφαιρας. Η οικολογική δράση ή είναι επαναστατική δράση ή δεν είναι απολύτως τίποτα.
Murray Bookchin – Η οικολογία και η επαναστατική σκέψη
The fear is that this bad ecology will become a new opiate of the people. And I’m against the ecologists’ anti-technology stance, the one that says, “we are alienated by manipulating nature, we should rediscover ourselves as natural beings”. I think we should alienate ourselves more from nature so we become aware of the utter contingency, the fragility of our natural being.
S.Zizek-New Scientist (via circulationwithinmyskull)
proposing the possibility of a strongly dialectical, ecological Marx…

Despite what I now see as the one-sidedness of “Marx’s Inorganic Body” (Clark, 1989), that article had the merit of proposing the possibility of a strongly dialectical, ecological Marx as the alternative in Marxist theory to the Promethean and managerial stewardship views. My view was (and remains) that the ecological dialectic remained primarily implicit in Marx’s thought and that “to develop the sub-merged ecological dimension of Marx would mean the negation of key aspects of his philosophy of history, his theory of human nature, and his view of social transformation” (p. 250), including the elements of “productivism and instrumentalism” still espoused by some in Marx’s name.

Although Marx did not develop the ecological dialectic, more than any other modern philosopher, he offered suggestions concerning the ways in which a nonidealist, historically grounded dialectic might be applied to the relationship between humanity and nature. Fortunately, many theorists have taken up the challenge over the past decade or more and have developed a sophisticated ecological Marxism that overcomes the limitations of orthodox Marxism and goes far beyond the environmental management view that Foster and Burkett (2000; see also Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000) defend.^3

.3. See in particular the articles in the “Marxism and Ecology,” “Ecological Socialism,” and other theoretical series that have appeared in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism over the past decade, including especially Kovel (1995) and O’Connor (1999).

Kovel, J. (1995). Ecological Marxism and dialectic. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6, 31-50.

O’Connor, J. (1999). A prolegomenon to an ecological Marxism: Thoughts on the material-ist conception of history. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 10, 77-106.

Source: John Clark - Marx’s Natures: A Response to Foster and Burkett

…from the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the globe by single individuals will appear quite as absurd as the private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole society, a nation, or even all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and like boni patres familias [good heads of the household], they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition.
Karl Marx, Capital: A critique of political economy, Vol. 3. Moscow: Progress, (Original work published 1894), p. 776
Frank M. Rotering - Ecology, Value, and Marx

 2008 Frank Rotering needsandlimits.org 1

Ecology, Value, and Marx

Written: June 14, 2005

Published: Synthesis/Regeneration 40 (Summer, 2006)

Author: Frank M. Rotering

The word “value” is a source of much confusion in economic discussions among Greens, for two reasons. First, the term has a variety of meanings, several of which are important within the Green worldview. Second, these meanings have not been clearly articulated, resulting in a Tower of Babel that impairs our progress. This article suggests how Greens might use the term “value” in the economic realm for maximum effectiveness.

Consider the word’s various meanings:

  • General worth or merit: “I value your friendship.”
  • Deeply held principles or ideals: the 10 key Green values
  • Inherent worth: Deep Ecology’s “intrinsic value”
  • Monetary worth: the market valuation of a commodity or other asset
  • Utility: the consumer’s subjective valuation of a commodity
  • The basis for prices in a capitalist economy: Marx’s exchange-value

The above list does not include the additional meanings that - in my view - the term should have within an economic framework based on the needs of humankind and the limits of nature. Such extensions are beyond the scope of this article. If you’re interested, see my website: needsandlimits.org.

In sorting out the existing meanings, the first step is to identify those that are clearly outside the economic realm. This is the case with the first two. We all understand that a valued friendship refers to a personal and not an economic assessment. Similarly, it is broadly accepted that “values” in the plural refer to personal or organizational principles. These two meanings of the term are obvious from their contexts and can continue to be used without fear of muddling our
economic conversations.

In Deep Ecology, “intrinsic value” refers to the ontological equality of human and non-human life, and to the consequent respect we should accord to all living things, irrespective of human ends. The movement accepts two terms as synonyms: “inherent value” and “inherent worth.”

I strongly suggest that Greens and the Deep Ecology movement itself adopt the term “inherent worth” for this purpose. There are two compelling reasons to do so. First, “value” is already overloaded, and if an accepted alternative exists, it should be used. Second, Deep Ecology’s concept of “intrinsic value” is not primarily economic, but rather ethical and philosophical. “Value” is a central term in economics, and it should be reserved for this sphere.

This leaves us with three economic meanings of “value”: monetary worth, utility, and the basis for prices and exchange.

 2008 Frank Rotering needsandlimits.org 2

The use of “value” for the monetary worth of an asset is central to today’s version of standard economics, which has progressively purged itself of the term’s deeper significance over time. For Greens, “monetary value” can be used as an unambiguous term for this narrow but necessary meaning of “value”.

Utility is one important area where standard economics and Marxist economics perceive the capitalist world in much the same way. One standard definition of utility is “the benefit or satisfaction that a person obtains from the consumption of a good or service.” (Economics, Michael Parkin, 1990) In Capital, Marx states that a commodity satisfies human wants, and that, “The nature of such wants, whether … they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference.” He then refers to this property of a commodity as its utility or use-value.

The problem with the term “utility” is that it has a broad interpretation and is a handy word in general conversation. To avoid overloading the term and to maximize precision, I suggest that Greens adopt “use-value” to refer to a consumer’s subjective valuation of a commodity.

The last economic meaning of value - the basis for capitalist prices and exchange - is the one that is technically the most challenging, and the one that is repeatedly misinterpreted and distorted.

A bit of history may help here. Adam Smith and the other classical economists of his time (the 18th century) recognized the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. The exchange-value of a commodity refers to the quantities of other commodities for which it can be exchanged. Smith ascribed the exchange-value of a commodity to the amount of labor required to produce it. David Ricardo adopted this concept in the 19th century, refined it, and used the
resulting theory to describe the burgeoning capitalist system.

Karl Marx in turn appropriated Ricardo’s theory and developed it further. Most significantly, Marx distinguished between labor-power, which is the productive capacity owned by the worker and purchased by the capitalist, and labor itself, which is the worker’s productive activity and the source of a commodity’s exchange-value.

The purpose of this “labor theory of value” is to explain how prices arise, how exchange is regulated, and how class relations develop in a capitalist system. It is therefore an explanatory principle, reflecting Marx’s understanding of the historically evolved facts about capitalist economies. Unfortunately, the theory is frequently misinterpreted as a normative statement about how commodities SHOULD be valued.

This misinterpretation caused immediate dismay among 18th century capitalists. After all, if their efforts did not contribute to commodity prices, what justified their claims to profits? More recently it has caused consternation among environmentalists, for a similar unfounded reason: if nature does not contribute to human wealth, where is the justification for valuing and preserving nature?

A typical example of the environmentalist error appeared recently in these pages. In his “Economic Philosophy and Green Electoralism,” David Orton writes, “Deeper Greens not only see Nature as having value in itself but also see Nature as the principal source of human wealth - not labor power as in Marxism.” (S-R 37, Spring 2005, p. 26)

 2008 Frank Rotering needsandlimits.org 3

In the first part of this statement I would replace “value” with “inherent worth,” for the reasons cited above. The second part of the statement is simply wrong. Marx does not ascribe the source of wealth principally to human effort, but to the equal contributions of humankind and nature. He quoted the early classical economist William Petty in relation to wealth: “labor is its father and the earth its mother.” (Capital Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, p. 50). Orton goes further astray by citing “labor power,” which Marx used to explain capitalist class relations, not wealth.

Returning to terminology, I would urge environmentalists to use “exchange-value” for the relationship between two commodities in exchange. Whether they adhere to the labor theory of value to explain this relationship is a different matter.

Let me summarize the suggestions made here.

First, the non-economic uses of “value” and “values” can be allowed to stand. In almost all cases, context will clearly establish our intended meanings.

Second, Deep Ecology should avoid the term “intrinsic value” because an accepted alternative exists, and because “value” is an indispensable term in the economic context, for which it should be reserved to the extent possible.

Third, we should use “monetary value” for the market valuation of an asset, “use-value” for the subjective valuation of a commodity, and “exchange-value” for the factors underlying commodity prices and exchange.

Agreement on these terms, and their broad adoption in Green economic discourse, will provide a solid basis for intellectual progress, and will help us identify conceptual errors and factual distortions.