NOEMATIC SENSE. Husserl distinguishes within the noema two moments: the thetic characteristic and the noematic sense. Husserl’s characterization of the noema as “the perceived [object] as perceived,” “the remembered [object] as remembered,” “the judged [state of affairs] as judged,” or, more generally “the intended [object] just as intended” foreshadows this distinction. The object’s manners of givenness with its appropriate thetic characteristic—for example, in perception the object as perceived is believed to exist—is distinguished from the noematic sense. Husserl uses the image of a core to distinguish the noematic sense from the full noema; the noematic sense is at the core of the full noema. The noematic sense, then, corresponds to what Husserl had formerly called act-matter, and it accounts for the presentation of the object in a determinate manner. In particular, the identical object is given with its “attributes” or, as Husserl sometimes puts it, its “predicates.” This reveals that the noematic sense is itself further distinguished into two moments: the determinable X which is the formal placeholder for the identical object and the attributes or predicates belonging to or predicable of that object.